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REQUIRING MUTUAL ASSENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: HOW TO 
MODIFY WRAP CONTRACTS TO REFLECT CONSUMER’S REALITY 
Matt Meinel* 
“Mutual manifestation of assent . . . is the touchstone of 
contract.” 1  The manifestation of mutual assent has evolved 
throughout history to accommodate mass commercialization and 
technological change. However, new problems have emerged with 
the rise of Internet contracting. Consumers, facing increasing 
numbers of inconspicuous and obtuse contract offers, are oblivious 
to many of the procedural and substantive rights they forfeit 
through their everyday activities. Intention to manifest mutual 
assent is increasingly becoming a legal fiction in cyberspace. 
Courts usually refer to two well-established types of Internet 
contracts, but contracts rarely perfectly fit either definition, 
leaving courts stranded somewhere in the middle. This Recent 
Development argues that courts unnecessarily emphasize 
categorization of wrap contracts in lieu of the real legal issue: the 
manifestation of mutual assent. Furthermore, courts should adopt 
a presumption against mutual assent for cases where assent is 
unclear. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
While criminal law comprises most of the legal screen time in 
popular culture, contract law occasionally takes center stage. In the 
final season of the popular TV show Parks & Recreation,2 the cast 
is outraged to discover that Gryzzl, an all-in-one internet search, 
social media, shopping, and phone company, is “data-mining” all 
of their personal information for the purpose of “learn[ing] 
everything about everyone.”3 Unfortunately, Ben Wyatt, the super-
nerd city manager in the show, discovers that through a convoluted 
series of documents, he signed away the privacy rights of the entire 
town to Gryzzl.4 Ron Swanson, who zealously defends his own 
                                                
2  See generally Parks and Recreation (NBC television broadcast), 
http://www.nbc.com/parks-and-recreation. 
 3 Parks and Recreation: Gryzzlbox (NBC television broadcast Jan. 27, 2015). 
 4 Id. The relevant clause was located in sub-footnote (only viewable by 
magnifying glass) in an appendix to an appendix of amendment 14 to 
amendment C of the twenty-seventh update of 500-page user agreement granting 
free Wi-Fi to everyone in town. 
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privacy,5 unsympathetically admonishes Ben stating, “If you’re 
going to sign a legally binding document, you need to read it 
thoroughly.”6 However, Ron changes his opinion upon discovering 
his son inadvertently fell under the terms of use because Ron’s 
wife had simply used a computer.7 While satirical, this episode 
raises an increasingly real-word issue: if Ben and Ron, as diligent 
as they are, cannot negotiate or protect their rights with a multi-
billion dollar Internet company, can anyone?8 
The Second Circuit considered this issue in Nicosia v. Amazon, 
Inc., 9  where the court took a small step towards protecting 
consumers from unknowingly entering into contracts.10 In this case, 
the plaintiff, Nicosia, had purchased dietary supplements on 
Amazon.com that were subsequently discovered to contain a 
substance banned by the FDA.11 The Eastern District of New York 
had dismissed Nicosia’s claim against Amazon because of a 
mandatory arbitration clause in the Conditions of Use,12 but the 
Second Circuit reversed and remanded, questioning whether 
Nicosia assented to and therefore was bound by the Conditions of 
Use.13 
This Recent Development analyzes how courts find mutual 
assent in online contracting, specifically arguing that courts should 
emphasize mutual assent when the facts lie between the two 
traditional Internet contracting frameworks, clickwrap and 
browsewrap. In Nicosia, the courts found that Amazon employed a 
“hybrid” clickwrap-browsewrap. 14  However, allowing a hybrid 
                                                
 5 Id. In the same episode, Ron stated he refused to carry pictures of his son 
“where anyone could see them” lest his son’s privacy be violated. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 See NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS, 
174 (2013) (“The oppressiveness of wrap contracts has become a joke—
literally.”). 
    9 834 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 10 Id. at 238; see also infra Section IV. 
 11 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 226. 
 12 Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 13 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 237–38. 
 14 See id. at 236; Nicosia, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 151–52. 
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approach to Internet contracting is not consistent with precedent, 
further erodes consumer protection, and achieves no practical 
benefits. Instead, on remand, the district court should use this 
opportunity to apply common law principles and find that a general 
presumption against assent exists when the evidence of assent is 
ambiguous. 
This analysis proceeds in four parts. Part II reviews the 
development of wrap contracts and examines the confusion and 
problems caused when mutual assent is ambiguous. Part III 
critiques the hybridwrap framework, arguing that instead of 
focusing on labels such as hybridwrap, browsewrap, or clickwrap, 
the court should determine whether the proposed contract satisfied 
the elements of mutual assent, notice, and intent to agree. Part IV 
discusses the facts, arguments, and holdings of the Nicosia case at 
the district and appellate courts. The district court found clear 
manifestation of mutual assent through a hybridwrap, but the 
Second Circuit held that reasonable minds could disagree about the 
manifestation assent. Part V argues that courts should adopt a 
presumption against assent in situations similar to Nicosia. Such a 
presumption would better reflect core contract doctrine in light of 
the factual status of notice in online contracting. A presumption 
against assent, supported by precedent, would provide benefits for 
courts, businesses, and consumers. 
II. WRAP CONTRACTS: FINDING MUTUAL ASSENT IN 
CYBERSPACE 
This section highlights the origin of wrap contract doctrine and 
the challenges courts now face in applying it. First, a review of the 
early wrap cases provides context and foundational guidelines for 
today. Second, ambiguous assent exemplify the struggles courts 
face in applying contract law in online contexts. Third, this section 
then concludes by expounding the high-stakes implications of how 
courts apply mutual assent doctrine moving forward. 
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A. Basic Contract Principles & Early Wrap Cases 
A transaction becomes a contract when parties mutually 
manifest assent to the terms of the agreement.15 Often referred to as 
a “meeting of the minds[,]”16 a manifestation of mutual assent 
requires that two parties agree to exchange promises and usually 
takes the form of an offer and an acceptance.17 To accept an offer, 
the offeree must be aware that there is an offer and that their action 
will be construed as an acceptance.18 When there is no actual 
knowledge of the offer, a consumer may have constructive notice.19 
Constructive notice exists in online contract formation when “a 
reasonably prudent offeree in these circumstances would have 
known of the existence of license terms.”20 
The advent of the Internet and e-commerce has required courts 
to apply centuries-old common law principles to new mediums, but 
the fundamentals of contract law remain unchanged 21  Most 
                                                
 15 See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 16 See, e.g., Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 18, 24, 50 (AM. LAW INST.  
1981). 
 18 See Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2012) (“As a 
general principle, an offeree cannot actually assent to an offer unless the offeree 
knows of its existence.”); Specht, 306 F.3d at 29–30 (“a consumer’s clicking on 
a download button does not communicate assent to contractual terms if the offer 
did not make clear to the consumer that clicking on the download button would 
signify assent to those terms.”). 
 19 See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 230 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing 
Specht, 306 F.3d at 32). Courts will also use the term “inquiry notice,” which is 
synonymous with “constructive notice” for the purposes of this article. 
 20 Specht, 306 F.3d at 31; see also Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 120 (“an offeree is 
still bound by the provision if he or she is on inquiry notice of the term and 
assents to it through the conduct that a reasonable person would understand to 
constitute assent.”). 
 21 Register.com Inc., v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004) (“While 
new commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new situations, it has 
not fundamentally changed the principles of contract.”); see also Woodrow 
Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM.U.L. REV. 1635, 1644 n. 64 
(2011). 
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relevantly, online contracts still require mutual assent. 22  By 
applying contracts principles and case law, two primary 
frameworks of contract formation on the Internet have emerged: 
clickwrap and browsewrap.23 In clickwrap agreements, users are 
presented with the actual terms of the agreement and are required 
to click “I agree” in order to proceed with the transaction.24 
Because the consumer makes a purposeful action to assent after 
clear notice of terms, clickwraps “expressly and unambiguously 
manifest” assent and are therefore enforceable contracts. 25 
Browsewrap agreements, on the other hand, only give notice of 
terms through hyperlink and do not require express assent.26 Thus, 
the case for mutual assent in browsewrap cases is more tenuous.27 
Unlike clickwrap, it is common for a court to hold a browsewrap 
agreement unenforceable.28 Nevertheless, if there is constructive or 
                                                
 22 Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(“Mutual manifestation of assent . . . is the touchstone of contract.”). 
 23 See Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 24 See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing 
Register.com, 356 F.3d at 402–03, 429); see also KIM, supra note 8, at 39. 
 25 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 233 (quoting Register.com, 356 F.3d at 429); see also 
KIM, supra note 8, at 39; Jessica L. Hubley, Online Consent and the On-Demand 
Economy: An Approach for the Millennial Circumstance, 8 HASTINGS SCI. & 
TECH. L. J. 1, 36 (2016). 
 26 KIM, supra note 8, at 41; see also Specht, 306 F.3d at 31–32 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(describing what would later be termed “browse-wrap”). 
 27 See Allison Brehm, Click Here to Accept the Terms of Service, 31 COMM. 
LAWYER 4, 4 (2015) (citing Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-05682-
LHK, 2014 WL 2903752, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014) (“Generally, courts 
have declined to enforce browsewrap agreements because the fundamental 
element of assent is lacking.”); see also KIM, supra note 8, at 41; Hartzog, supra 
note 21, at 1644. 
 28 See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 
2014); see also Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 472 
(2006) (“An examination of the cases that have considered browsewraps in the 
last five years demonstrates that the courts have been willing to enforce terms of 
use against corporations, but have not been willing to do so against 
individuals.”). For an early case refusing to enforce an online browsewrap 
agreement see Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd, 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980–81 (E.D. Cal. 
2000) (finding the terms and conditions hyperlink unidentifiable because it was 
“small gray text on a gray background”). 
186 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 180 
inquiry notice, courts may still find assent in browsewrap cases.29  
Constructive notice “depends heavily on whether the design and 
content of that webpage rendered the existence of terms reasonably 
conspicuous.”30 
In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,31 a foundational 
Internet contracting case, the website at issue allowed plaintiffs to 
download software without viewing or agreeing to the terms of 
use, which contained a mandatory arbitration clause.32 However, 
the website had a hyperlink to the terms at the very bottom of the 
webpage, far enough below the download button to where the 
plaintiffs would have had to scroll down in their web browser to 
see the notice.33 The court, in determining whether the plaintiffs 
were bound by the terms of use, evaluated whether a “reasonably 
prudent offeree in [the] plaintiffs’ position” would have had notice 
of the terms prior to downloading.34 Concerned about maintaining 
“manifestation of assent . . . [as] the touchstone of contract,”35 the 
court asserted that requiring reasonably conspicuous notice of 
terms and unambiguous assent was essential for contract validity.36 
The court noted that the downloading itself was not sufficient to 
form a contract.37 Therefore, because the plaintiffs could download 
without viewing the notice, and the notice was invisible unless the 
plaintiffs scrolled further than they had reason to, the court held 
                                                
 29 Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177 (“[T]he validity of the browsewrap agreement 
turns on whether the website puts a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of 
the terms of the contract.”); see also KIM, supra note 8, at 41. 
 30 Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing 
Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177–78). 
   31 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 32 Id. at 22–23 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 33 Id. at 23–24. 
 34 Id. at 20, 35. 
 35 Id. at 29 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981)) (“The conduct of a party is not effective as a manifestation of his 
assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to 
know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents.”). 
 36 Id. at 35. 
 37 Id. at 20, 29–30 (“[C]licking on a . . . button does not communicate assent 
to contractual terms if the offer did not make clear to the consumer that clicking 
on the . . . button would signify assent to those terms.”). 
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that the reasonably prudent offeree would not have notice of the 
terms, and thus there was no contract.38 With the holding in Specht, 
the Second Circuit laid the foundation for browsewrap and its 
general unenforceability.39 But, legal tension continues to grow as 
courts and parties find themselves ambiguously in between 
enforceable clickwrap agreements on one side and unenforceable 
browsewrap claims on the other. 
B. The Rise of Hybridwrap Cases 
When cases meet the traditional definitions of clickwrap or 
browsewrap agreements, the legal analysis regarding contract 
formation is straightforward. Courts find clickwrap agreements to 
be enforceable contracts and browsewrap agreements to be 
unenforceable. Increasingly, however, courts are encountering 
cases where a “browsewrap agreement resembles a clickwrap 
agreement.”40 This occurs when the user is doing more than just 
passively browsing a website without any notice; therefore the use 
does not meet the classic browsewrap definition, but it also does 
not strictly meet the traditional clickwrap definition. When 
confronted with these facts, courts have started looking for a 
middle ground in their analysis of these mixed agreements—the 
hybridwrap.41 The next two cases are examples of when courts 
applied “hybridwrap” analysis but achieved different results. 
                                                
 38 Id. at 20, 30–31. 
 39 Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(“Where the link to a websites terms of use is buried at the bottom of the page or 
tucked away in obscure corners of the website where users are unlikely to see it, 
courts have refused to enforce the browsewrap agreement.”); see also KIM, 
supra note 8, at 42. 
 40 Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1176 (“Courts have also been more willing to find the 
requisite notice for constructive assent where the browsewrap agreement 
resembles a clickwrap agreement—that is, where the user is required to 
affirmatively acknowledge the agreement before proceeding with use of the 
website.”). 
 41 See, e.g., Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015). 
188 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 180 
In Meyer v. Kalanick, 42  the plaintiff allegedly agreed to a 
mandatory arbitration clause and class action ban when he created 
a rider account with Uber using a smartphone app, but the plaintiff 
argued there was insufficient notice that he was agreeing to the 
terms.43 On the registration screen requiring the plaintiff to enter 
his payment information, there was a “Register” button, and at the 
bottom of the screen, there was the following notice: “By creating 
an Uber account, you agree to the Terms of Service & Privacy 
Policy.”44 The court determined the notice was “barely legible[,]” 
and it did not take the user directly to the terms and conditions 
even when the link was followed.45 Thus, the court found that 
because of the relative obscurity of the Terms of Service statement, 
there was not reasonable notice.46 
In contrast to Meyer, the court in Fteja v. Facebook found a 
valid contract. 47  Facebook sought to transfer the case to the 
Northern District of California pursuant to a forum selection clause 
found in its Terms of Policy. 48  While creating his Facebook 
account, the plaintiff clicked a “Sign Up” button with the 
following language directly below it: “By clicking Sign Up, you 
are indicating that you have read and agree to the Terms of 
Service.”49 The phrase “Terms of Service” was a hyperlink to a 
page containing the full terms.50 After reviewing both browsewrap 
and clickwrap doctrine, the court determined that the plaintiff had 
sufficient notice of the terms and that his click would be construed 
as assent to them, thereby binding himself to the forum selection 
clause. 51  Because hybridwraps allow companies to have 
enforceable contracts without the burdens of clickwrap, 
                                                
42 15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016). 
 43 Id. at 7, 12. 
 44 Id. at 13–14. 
 45 Id. at 14–15. 
 46 Id. at 30–31. 
47 Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 839 (S.D.N.Y 2012). 
 48 Id. at 834. 
 49 Id. at 834–35. 
 50 Id. at 835. 
 51 Id. at 840–41. 
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hybridwraps are becoming increasingly popular, but they also pose 
many concerns. 
C. Lowering Mutual Assent Requirements 
As wrap contract law continues to develop, several worrisome 
trends grow alongside it. When courts rely heavily on constructive 
notice to derive mutual assent, it undermines the foundational 
theories of contract law.52 Despite the well-known fact that no one 
reads53 or understands54 online terms, nor realistically could do so if 
they wanted to,55 courts have consistently placed the burden of 
reading and understanding terms of use on the consumer by 
applying constructive notice liberally.56 
                                                
 52 KIM, supra note 8, at 16. (“The problem with wrap contracts is that they fail 
on the level of doctrine[.]”). 
 53 See generally Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on 
the Internet: Ignoring the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of 
Social Networking Services, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2757465 (Aug. 24, 2016) 
(finding 74% of study participants did not read agreement in which they agreed 
to give the company their first-born child). 
 54See Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *32–
33 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016) (quoting “Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau Study Finds That Arbitration Agreements Limit Relief for Consumers,” 
Consumer Protection Financial Bureau, Mar. 10, 2015, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-study-finds-that-
arbitration-agreements-limit-relief-for-consumers.) (“Over three quarters of 
those who said they understood what arbitration is acknowledged they did not 
know whether their credit card agreement contained an arbitration clause. 
Among consumers whose contract included an arbitration clause, fewer than 7 
percent recognized that they could not sue their credit card issuer in court.”). 
 55 KIM, supra note 8, at 213 (citing Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith 
Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4:3 I/S: A J. OF LAW AND POL’Y 
540, 562 (2008)) (“One study estimated that it would cost the average American 
Internet user 201 hours or the equivalent of $3,534 a year to read the privacy 
policies of each website that he or she visits.”). 
 56 See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(“[F]ailure to read a contract before agreeing to its terms does not relieve a party 
of its obligations under the contract[.]”). 
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This becomes particularly salient when consumers 
unknowingly give up important rights.57 Because corporations draft 
wrap contracts, they generally contain clauses that favor the 
company’s interest over consumers who have very little, if any, 
opportunity to negotiate.58 Major difficulties, and much litigation, 
arise when consumers agree to binding arbitration by implicitly 
agreeing to Conditions of Use and thereby denying courts any 
jurisdiction.59 When combined with class action bans, mandatory 
arbitration clauses become particularly troublesome for 
consumers.60 The purpose of class action is to “allow[] people who 
lost small amounts of money to join together to seek relief.”61 
However, if the plaintiffs are forced out of court and into 
arbitration, they can lose their class action status, and the litigation 
is often no longer cost effective for the plaintiff.62 
Moreover, although not much information exists on the 
arbitration proceedings themselves,63 arbitrators are often biased in 
                                                
 57 See Emily Canis, One “Like” Away: Mandatory Arbitration for Consumers, 
26 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 127, 135 (2015) (“[P]eople are frequently at risk of 
entering into mandatory arbitration agreements without even knowing it, simply 
by interacting on one of these Internet applications.”). 
 58 See KIM, supra note 8, at 21, 26; Cheryl Preston, Please Note: You Have 
Waived Everything: Can Notice Redeem Online Contracts? 64 AM.U.L. REV. 
535, 536 (“Wrap contracts are merely the means for powerful contract drafter to 
legislate legal results.”); Canis, supra note 57, at 154 (“While [clickwrap and 
browsewrap agreements] were initially fair to both companies and consumers, 
these concepts have also evolved into a dangerous mechanism where companies 
can control consumers’ legal rights without a consumer ever realizing.”). 
 59 See, e.g., Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 147–48 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 60  Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, 
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-
stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=0 (“By banning class actions, companies 
have essentially disabled consumer challenges to practices like predatory 
lending, wage theft and discrimination[.]”). 
 61 Id. 
 62 See id. (“Roughly two-thirds of consumers contesting credit card fraud, fees 
or costly loans received no monetary awards in arbitration”). 
 63  Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a 
‘Privatization of the Justice System,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), 	
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favor of the companies, and there are limited procedural safeguards 
in place for consumers.64 Most often, plaintiffs decide not to pursue 
their claims, accepting the corporations’ desired outcome.65 While 
mandatory arbitration clauses and class action bans have been 
struck down as unconscionable,66 the Supreme Court recently, in a 
string of cases,67 strengthened the validity of arbitration clauses,68 
stating “courts must ‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements 
according to their terms[.]”69 The use of arbitration clauses and 
class-action bans by corporations has continued to increase. 70 
When the rise of arbitration clauses is coupled with a reduction in 
consumer negotiating power, the result is consumers involuntarily 
giving away their right for their grievances to be heard in a court of 
law.71 
III. HYBRIDWRAP’S LEGAL UTILITY (OR LACK THEREOF) 
While formulating a hybridwrap framework for scenarios “in 
between” clickwrap and browsewrap may make intuitive sense, 
                                                                                                         
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-
privatization-of-the-justice-system.html (“Little is known about arbitration 
because the proceedings are confidential and the federal government does not 
require cases to be reported.”). 
 64 See id. 
 65 See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 60. 
 66  See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) 
(discussing other cases in which mandatory arbitration clauses and class action 
bans were struck down). 
 67 See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 
(2013); CompuCredit Corp v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); AT&T 
Mobility, 131 S. Ct. 1740.  
 68 See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 60 (finding 83% of class 
action bans were upheld in 2014); see also Canis, supra note 57, at 144 
(discussing how these Supreme Court cases do not favor consumers). 
 69 Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. 
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)). 
 70 Canis, supra note 57, at 128 (“For many of these clickwrap agreements, it is 
quite common for companies to try to include a provision that mandates forced 
arbitration.”). 
 71 See generally Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note at 60 (discussing 
the shrinking consumers’ ability to litigate in court due to the rise in mandatory 
arbitration clauses). 
192 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 180 
hybridwrap fails both doctrinally and practically. Since the 
determinative fact in all wrap cases is whether there is a 
manifestation of mutual assent, adding another category of 
“hybridwrap” is, at best, simply a label acknowledging that the 
case is unclear as a matter of law on these facts. In opinions and 
briefs, courts and parties already take inordinate amounts of space 
to distinguish between the wrap labels instead of focusing on 
mutual assent, and creating a hybridwrap fosters this. Hybridwrap 
encourages courts to further unmoor contracts from mutual assent 
by introducing the binding power of clickwrap into the ambiguity 
of browsewrap. Overall, courts should reject hybridwrap 
terminology, and focus on manifestation of mutual assent. 
A. Despite the Labels, There Is One Test: Manifestation of Mutual 
Assent 
Before browsewrap or clickwrap even existed, manifestation of 
mutual assent formed the basis for all contracts.72 All wrap cases 
ultimately are determined by the presence of mutual assent.73 The 
presumptive validity of clickwrap agreements does not stem from 
the designation of “clickwrap”; rather, whenever a fact pattern 
matches the clickwrap paradigm by presenting the terms of 
agreement and requiring a purposeful action for assent, those facts 
conclusively meet the requirements for a manifestation of mutual 
                                                
 72 Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (1981)) (“Mutual 
manifestation of assent . . . is the touchstone of contract.”); see also supra 
Section II.A. 
 73 For example, in Register.com v. Verio, Inc. the Second Circuit unusually 
enforced a “browsewrap” agreement because it found mutual assent. 
Register.com Inc., v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). The offeree, 
Verio, consistently used the offeror’s website, Register.com, for business 
purposes in a way that violated the terms of use. Id. at 396–97. After each 
business use of the website, Verio received notice of the terms and conditions, 
and thus Verio argued that they were not binding because the terms were not 
available before the transaction. Id. at 402. The court, however, found that Verio 
had sufficient notice because of its continued, regular use after receiving actual 
notice of the terms. Id. at 401. 
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assent. 74  Similarly, browsewraps are not generally invalid 
agreements because of the label; browsewrap fact patterns do “not 
require the user to manifest assent to the terms and conditions 
expressly.”75 Thus, if a court were to apply hybridwrap, the court 
would simply note that the facts do not meet the strict definition of 
either clickwrap or browsewrap, and then proceed to conduct the 
same search for a manifestation of mutual assent that it would have 
regardless. 
The Second Circuit perfectly demonstrated this concept in 
Nicosia v. Amazon.com. The court noted that while Nicosia argued 
only browsewrap principles apply, Amazon and the district court 
maintained this was “something in between.”76 The Second Circuit 
assumed without deciding that hybridwrap should apply, 77  but 
instead of focusing on the specific type of agreement, the court, 
relying on precedent, focused on the notice to the reasonably 
prudent offeree and manifestations of assent.78 The Second Circuit 
had the flexibility to assume without deciding that hybridwrap 
applied because that determination was ultimately irrelevant to the 
case.79 
Nevertheless, the increased acceptance by courts of 
browsewraps resembling clickwraps is not contingent upon the 
labels themselves. Rather, the more a browsewrap resembles a 
clickwrap, the more likely it is to contain the requisite 
                                                
 74 See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Register.com, 356 F.3d at 429). 
 75 Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366–67 (E.D.N.Y. 
2009)). 
 76 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 235. 
 77 Id. at 236. 
 78 Id. (citing Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2012)) 
(“[I]n cases such as this, where the purported assent is largely passive, and the 
contract-formation question will often turn on whether a reasonably prudent 
offeree would be on inquiry notice of the term at issue.”); see also Nguyen, 763 
F.3d at 1177 (“[T]he validity of the browsewrap agreement turns on whether the 
website puts a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the 
contract.”). 
 79 See Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 236. 
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manifestation of mutual assent through constructive notice that 
courts always look for in browsewrap scenarios.80 Ultimately, “all 
these labels can take courts only so far,”81 for most cases will fall 
somewhere in between browsewrap and clickwrap, requiring fact-
based inquiries that defy bright-line rules.82 Therefore, regardless 
of how a court classifies a fact pattern, the court’s finding will be 
determined by the manifestation of assent by the reasonably 
prudent offeree. 83 However, courts, and consequently litigating 
parties, focus too much on the wrap labels before reaching the 
underlying issues. 
B. Examples of Overemphasis on Wrap Labels 
When analyzing wrap contracts, courts and parties often 
rhetorically overemphasize where the facts of the case fall on the 
browsewrap/clickwrap spectrum. The Nicosia district court 
opinion, and the parties’ briefs on appeal, exemplifies this trend. 
The district court decided that Amazon’s terms of use constituted a 
hybridwrap because the court assumed consumers automatically 
                                                
 80 See, e.g., id. at 233 (citing Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 
17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002)) (“In determining the validity of browsewrap agreements, 
courts often consider whether a website user has actual or constructive notice of 
the conditions.”); In re Zappos.com, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063–64 (D. Nev. 
2012) (“[T]he determination of the validity of a browsewrap contract depends 
on whether the user has actual or constructive knowledge of a website’s terms 
and conditions.”). 
 81 Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *21 
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016). 
 82 Id. at 30. 
 83  See Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1176–77 (“[W]hether the website puts a 
reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract . . . 
depends on the design and content of the website and the agreement’s 
webpage.”); Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“[T]he contract-formation question will often turn on whether a reasonably 
prudent offeree would be on inquiry notice of the term at issue.”); Meyer, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *30 (quoting Specht, 306 F.3d at 35) 
(“Consequently, courts must embark on a ‘fact-intensive inquiry,’ in order to 
make determination about the existence of ‘[r]reasonably conspicuous notice’ in 
any given case”). 
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agreed to the terms when they placed their order.84 In doing so, the 
court failed to assess whether consumers had sufficient notice that 
the clicking of the “Place your order” button would be a 
manifestation of assent. 
Likewise, appellant Nicosia’s brief demonstrated a 
misconception of wrap contract formation.85 Nicosia repeatedly 
and prominently based his argument on whether the court should 
apply browsewrap or clickwrap “principles” and “rules,” arguing 
that the court should only rely on browsewrap precedent while 
clickwrap cases should be excluded from consideration.86 In his 
argument, Nicosia spends unnecessary time distinguishing between 
clickwrap and browsewrap instead of focusing on the actual 
dispositive issue of mutual assent.87 Similarly, Amazon also missed 
the point in its appellee brief by overemphasizing the act of 
clicking.88 It is not the clicking itself that is important, even in a 
clickwrap analysis, but rather the clicking is important to the extent 
that it expressly manifests assent. 
While the arguments in the party briefs are not important legal 
doctrine, they demonstrate the inefficiencies created by over-
emphasizing labels. The parties waste valuable effort making 
legally insignificant distinctions instead of succinctly identifying 
and arguing the determinative legal issues, and the courts, as a 
                                                
 84 Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 143, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015). 
 85 See Reply Brief for Appellant at 4–13, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 
F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 86 Brief for Appellant at 26, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (“C. The District Court Applied Inapposite Clickwrap Principles.); 
Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, 8, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220 
(2d Cir. 2016) (“I. AMAZON CANNOT EXPLAIN AWAY THE DISTRICT 
COURT’S FAILRUE TO APPLY THIS COURT’S BROWSEWRAP RULES”; 
“II. CLICKWRAP PRINCIPLES DO NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE.”). 
 87 See Brief for Appellant at 16–29, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 
220 (2d Cir. 2016); Reply Brief for Appellant at 4–11, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 834 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 88 See Brief for Appellee at 28, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220 
(2d Cir. 2016) (“Plaintiff acknowledged agreement by affirmatively clicking to 
proceed with the transaction”). 
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result, must waste time wading through irrelevant arguments. 
Adopting hybridwrap as a form of contracting continues to fuel 
this focus on the including or excluding the correct “type” of legal 
precedent and principles instead of focusing on how the facts 
actually correspond to finding a manifestation of mutual assent. 
C. Ill-Effects of Hybridwrap on Mutual Assent 
Hybridwraps present solutions to problems that do not exist 
and exacerbate problems that do exist. The browsewrap doctrine is 
sufficient to resolve contract formation issues that fall short of full 
clickwrap, but attempting to merge clickwrap and browsewrap to 
cover ambiguous cases will result in misapplication of the law and 
greater inequity toward consumers. 
Practically, there is no gap between clickwrap and browsewrap 
that hybridwrap needs to fill, because there is no situation where 
“clicking” without actual or constructive notice of an offer would 
be legally relevant. For example, in Fteja v. Facebook, the 
importance of clicking “Sign Up” turned on whether the user 
would have constructive notice that clicking would constitute 
assent.89 If the user had no notice, then clicking to register would 
solely manifest intent to register.90 However, because there was 
constructive notice, clicking to register unambiguously manifested 
assent.91 In the first scenario, the click is irrelevant; in the second 
scenario, the click is dispositive. 
Furthermore, while the hybridwrap focus on the action of 
clicking should not add anything without proper notice, applying 
hybridwrap will confuse and bias courts into considering the click 
when the click should not be considered. Fundamentally, the 
hybrid approach blurs the line between actions manifesting assent 
and factors to be considered for notice. A user cannot manifest 
assent without proper notice,92 but allowing the courts to evaluate 
                                                
 89 See Fteja,  841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y 2012). 
 90 See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 29–30 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 91 Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 841. 
 92 Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2012) (“As a 
general principle, an offeree cannot actually assent to an offer unless the offeree 
knows of its existence.”). 
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both the assenting act and notice simultaneously, as hybridwrap 
does, places the factual cart before the legal horse.93 
The ultimate question in wrap contract disputes is whether 
there was mutual assent. In clickwrap cases, the “clicking-action” 
constitutes an actual manifestation of assent, settling the issue. In a 
browsewrap analysis, the click itself does not increase or decrease 
the chances that the consumer had notice of the terms and should 
not be considered until after notice is established.94 Thus, courts 
should continue to only refer to clickwrap and browsewrap fact 
patterns. Any cases that fall short of clickwrap should be handled 
as browsewrap where the court must find the reasonably prudent 
offeree would be put on constructive notice that the terms exist and 
an action will constitute assent. Adding another label does not help 
courts ascertain the existence of mutual assent.95 
Additionally, utilizing hybridwrap exacerbates the existing 
concerns about wrap contracts by functionally creating a 
presumption in favor of assent, thereby further weighting the scales 
against the consumer. 96  The question of whether there is a 
hybridwrap arises when there is a browsewrap with a little 
something extra—some extra action by the consumer that 
distinguishes it from a pure browsewrap case.97 Since companies 
seeking to enforce the agreement will over-emphasize the action,98 
courts will be tempted to allow the action to bias their finding of 
notice.99 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit observed that “[c]ourts have . . . 
been more willing to find that requisite notice for constructive 
assent where the browsewrap agreement resembles a clickwrap 
                                                
 93 See Specht, 306 F.3d at 29–30. 
 94 See id. 
 95 Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *21–22 
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016). 
 96 See Preston, supra note 58, at 536 (“Wrap contracts are merely the means 
for powerful contract drafter to legislate legal results.”). 
 97 See Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835, 838 (S.D.N.Y 2012). 
 98 See Brief for Appellee at 20, 28, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 
220 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 99 See, e.g., Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 151–52 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
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agreement—that is, where the user is required to affirmatively 
acknowledge the agreement before proceeding with use of the 
website.”100 
For the above reasons, this Recent Development will forgo use 
of the term “hybridwrap” as much as possible in favor of focusing 
on the core contracting terms of mutual assent and notice, and the 
district court on remand should do likewise. While browsewrap 
and clickwrap frameworks are crucial for defining the spectrum of 
mutual assent issues courts face, they should be used only as 
guideposts for orientating the court on the continuum of 
precedents. However, since most cases fall in the middle ground, 
courts should expeditiously move to evaluations of notice and 
intent to assent, which are the truly determinative criteria. 
Similarly, this Recent Development will continue to utilize the 
well-established terms of clickwrap and browsewrap, but the 
driving focus will be creating a framework through which to 
analyze the middle ground. 
IV. NICOSIA V. AMAZON.COM: FACTS AND ARGUMENTS 
This section examines the Nicosia case and how the district 
court and the Second Circuit differed in their analysis of mutual 
assent. After stating the facts and procedural history of the case, 
this section looks at what the district court found and why, and 
why the Second Circuit found that no enforceable contract existed. 
A. Facts & the District Court’s Decision 
In 2013, Nicosia purchased weight-loss pills on 
Amazon.com. 101  However, these pills contained the chemical 
sibutramine, which the FDA withdrew from the market in 2010 
because of negative health risks.102 Nicosia filed a class action suit 
against Amazon.com claiming violation of the Consumer Product 
Safety Act and seeking damages and an injunction against selling 
                                                
 100 Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 101 Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 226 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 102 Id. (“[T]he FDA advised physicians to stop prescribing sibutramine and to 
advise patients to cease its consumption due to its risks[.]”). 
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products with sibutramine.103 In district court, Amazon moved to 
dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, arguing Amazon’s 
Conditions of Use contained a mandatory arbitration clause and a 
class action ban.104 Amazon claimed that Nicosia assented to the 
Conditions of Use when he made online purchases.105 At the time 
of purchase, the checkout screen contained a link to the Conditions 
of Use and a statement reading, “By placing your order, you agree 
to Amazon.com’s Conditions of Use.”106 The Conditions of Use 
included a mandatory arbitration provision and a class action 
waiver.107 Amazon argued that clicking the “Place your order” 
button constituted agreement, per the hyperlink notice provided on 
                                                
 103 Id. at 227; see also Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–89 
(2012). 
 104 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 226–27; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 105 Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 151–52 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015). Amazon also contended, and the district court agreed, that when setting 
up his Amazon account in 2008, Nicosia must have checked a box indicating he 
agreed with the Conditions of Use. Id. at 145. However, Nicosia maintained that 
he never created an account, never agreed to the 2008 Conditions of Use, and 
that Amazon had insufficient proof that he did. Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 227. The 
2008 Conditions of Use did not have an arbitration clause, id., but the 2008 
Conditions of Use did state that Amazon “reserve[s] the right to make changes 
to . . . these Conditions of Use at any time,” Nicosia, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 145. The 
district court found that Nicosia must have created an account and took that into 
consideration when evaluating the overall mutual assent. Id. at 151–52. The 
district court found this provided additional constructive notice to the later 
Conditions of Use. Id. But the Second Circuit held that it was improper to 
consider the creation of the account under the well-established standard for the 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which requires the court “accept[] 
all factual allegations as true, and draw[] all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s 
favor.” Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 231–35. While the factual issue of whether Nicosia 
did explicitly agree to the Conditions of Use upon creating an account may 
ultimately be dispositive in this litigation, this Recent Development will 
exclusively focus on the possible mutual assent at the time of purchase. 
 106 Nicosia, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 146; Brief for Appellee at 7, Nicosia v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 107 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 227 (“Any dispute or claim . . . will be resolved by 
binding arbitration, rather than in court . . . . We each agree that any dispute 
resolution proceedings will be conducted only on an individual basis and not in 
a class . . . action.”). 
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the purchase page.108 Nicosia, however, argued that the Conditions 
of Use were not enforceable because he never intended to assent to 
those terms; rather, he simply placed his order.109 
On these facts, the Eastern District of New York found there 
was a valid contract to arbitrate and thus granted Amazon’s motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.110 When evaluating whether 
Nicosia assented to the Conditions of Use, the district court applied 
a hybridwrap analysis.111 The district court said that even though 
the Conditions of Use were only viewable through hyperlink (like 
a browsewrap), the hyperlink was “conspicuous” and thus 
provided constructive notice. 112  Since the consumer received 
notice, he agreed to the condition by completing the purchase.113 
Therefore, the mandatory arbitration clause and the class action 
waiver bound Nicosia.114 
B. Second Circuit’s Reasoning & Reversal 
The Second Circuit found that the district court erred in 
granting the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.115 The 
court began its analysis by reviewing the pertinent case law 
regarding wrap labels, but ultimately the court focused on the 
requirements of mutual assent: conspicuous notice and intent to 
assent.116 The court determined that the facts in this case did not 
conform to either the traditional clickwrap or browsewrap 
                                                
 108 Nicosia, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 150. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 144. 
 111 Id. at 151–52 (quoting Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 
1176–77 (9th Cir. 2014)) (“Courts have . . . been more willing to find that 
requisite notice for constructive assent where the browsewrap agreement 
resembles a clickwrap agreement—that is, where the user is required to 
affirmatively acknowledge the agreement before proceeding with use of the 
website.”). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 151–53. 
 115 Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 234–35, 238 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 116 Id. at 232–33. 
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definitions. 117  Thus, “assum[ing] without deciding that the 
agreement was a hybrid between a clickwrap and a browsewrap 
agreement,” the court proceeded to use the reasonably prudent 
offeree test, requiring notice of the Conditions of Use and assent to 
those Conditions.118 
Thus, the determinative issue before the court was whether 
Nicosia had constructive notice of the Conditions of Use.119 On that 
issue, the court held that Amazon failed to show that Nicosia was 
on notice and that he assented to the Conditions of Use.120 The 
court stated that constructive notice “depends heavily on whether 
the design and content of that webpage rendered the existence of 
terms reasonably conspicuous.”121 Focusing on the facts, the court 
first noted that the “critical sentence” was in a smaller font then the 
rest of the page.122 Moreover, the court stressed that there were 
many items on the page competing for the user’s attention,123 and 
                                                
 117 Id. at 233, 236. 
 118 Id. at 236 (citing Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 
2012)) (“[I]n cases such as this, where the purported assent is largely passive, 
and the contract-formation question will often turn on whether a reasonably 
prudent offeree would be on inquiry notice of the term at issue.”); see also 
Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he 
validity of the browsewrap agreement turns on whether the website puts a 
reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract.”). 
 119 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 235. 
 120 Id. at 237–38. 
 121 Id. at 233 (citing Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177–78). 
 122 Id. at 236. 
 123 Here the court listed the facts that it found legally relevant. Id.  
“Turning to the Order Page, we are not convinced that notice was 
sufficient as a matter of . . . law . . . . Among other things, users are 
shown their shipping address, billing address, and payment method, 
and given the option to edit that information or ‘try Amazon Locker.’ 
Users are also given the opportunity to change the delivery date, enter 
gift cards, and promotional codes, and sign up for “FREE Two-Day 
Shipping” four times in the center of the page, appearing in orange, 
green, and black fonts, and white font against an orange banner . . . . 
[A] ‘Place your order’ button above a box with the heading ‘Order 
Summary.’ The Order Summary box lists the cost of the items to be 
purchased, shipping and handling costs, total price before tax, 
estimated tax to be collected, purchase total, gift card amount, and 	
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the notice itself, which was not bold or capitalized, was not 
reasonably conspicuous compared to the other distracting elements 
on the webpage.124 Therefore, the court concluded that the district 
court erred in finding Nicosia had failed to state a claim.125 
The Second Circuit did not decide the hybridwrap issue or 
whether Nicosia manifested mutual assent. Instead, the court 
vacated and remanded the case because “reasonable minds could 
disagree on the reasonableness of the notice.” 126  By simply 
assuming the validity and existence of a hybridwrap and not 
making a holding on the ultimate assent issue, the Second Circuit 
left these questions open for discussion at the lower court on 
remand.127 To make a decision regarding the manifestation of 
assent in this case, the district court will need to adopt a framework 
for analyzing the facts of this case. The next sections lay out what 
this framework should be. 
V. CREATING A COMMON LAW PRESUMPTION AGAINST ASSENT 
Regardless of whether courts reject the hybridwrap label, the 
courts must determine how to equitably apply the common law of 
contracts to fact patterns with ambiguous mutual assent. Currently, 
courts use the reasonably prudent offeree standard to assess 
whether there would be notice. Determining who is the “reasonable 
person” is impossible to precisely define, as every first-year law 
student learned in torts, but in light of well-established facts that no 
one does or can read all of the terms and conditions they 
encounter, 128  courts should reevaluate the capabilities of the 
                                                                                                         
order total. The words ‘Order total’ appear in bold, red font . . . . Near 
the bottom of the page, there are a number of sentences in faint, black 
font directing users to links to other Amazon webpages for additional 
information, such as tax and seller information, customer assistance 
pages, and product returns policies. At the very bottom of the page, 
links to the Conditions of Use and Privacy Policy appear again in 
blue.” 
 124 Id. at 236–37. 
 125 Id. at 226. 
 126 Id. at 237–38; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 127 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 235–36, 238. 
    128 Supra Section II.C. 
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reasonably prudent offeree to bring wrap contracts more in line 
with contract doctrine. 129 
A. Defining a Presumption Against Assent 
The legal reasonably prudent offeree should move closer to 
reality by courts beginning with the rebuttable presumption that 
there is no mutual assent. In cases where mutual assent is at issue, 
courts should presume that (1) consumers will not have notice of 
the terms and conditions, and (2) consumers will not have notice 
that their conduct will constitute acceptance of those terms.130 
Adopting these presumptions would require courts to critically 
evaluate whether the crucial elements of mutual assent were 
satisfied by the facts presented.131 
The notice of terms must be conspicuous.132 In Specht, the 
inconspicuousness of the terms of agreement was dispositive.133 
The website had a hyperlink to the terms at the very bottom of the 
webpage, far enough below the download button to where the 
plaintiffs would have had to scroll down in their web browser to 
see the notice.134 Because there was not “immediate visible notice” 
of the terms, the reasonably prudent offeree would not have known 
                                                
 129 See Preston, supra note 58, at 575 (“Courts certainly can, and should, 
increase the scrutiny and develop common law standards of fairness in the 
online context.”). 
 130 See Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *31 
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016) (“[T]he Uber registration screen . . . did not adequately 
call users’ attention to the existence of the Terms of Service, let alone to the fact 
that, by registering to use Uber, a user was agreeing to them.”). 
 131 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“The conduct of a party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless 
he intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the 
other party may infer form his conduct that he assents.”). 
 132 Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 31 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(“Clarity and conspicuousness of arbitration terms are important in securing 
informed consent.”); see also Conspicuous, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014) (“[C]learly visible or obvious. Whether a printed clause is 
conspicuous as a matter of law usually depends on the size and style of the 
typeface.”). 
 133 Specht, 306 F.3d at 31.  
 134 Id. at 23–24. 
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about the terms.135 Generally, even if the notice is present on the 
consumer’s screen, it may not be conspicuous, for the terms must 
stand out based on the website design. 136  When considering 
whether the consumer will direct their attention to the notice, the 
court should consider what other elements are competing for the 
consumer’s limited attention.137 In other words, compared to the 
other elements on the webpage, there must be reason to believe 
that the notice would garner the attention of the reasonably prudent 
offeree. In Nicosia, the Second Circuit observed that the notice of 
the Conditions of Use were not “conspicuous in light of the whole 
page” because the notice was not bold or capitalized, while the rest 
of the page was full of links and advertisements with more 
attention-grabbing colors, positions, and fonts.”138 
In Meyer, the court evaluated the relative conspicuousness of 
the notice by comparing the visual prominence of the Terms of 
Service with the other “very user-friendly and obvious” elements 
on the screen.139 The court found that the notice on the Uber app 
was not “likely to disrupt viewers’ experiences in some way and 
draw their attention to the terms and conditions . . . .”140 Although 
the terms were listed right under the “Register” button, the notice 
was “barely legible” and there was nothing otherwise drawing 
attention to the terms.141 Rather, the court concluded that the app 
creators designed the visual layout to encourage the consumer to 
register without noticing the terms of agreement. 142  Meyers 
demonstrates how the presumption against notice would be 
applied. Instead of simply relying on the existence of the notice on 
                                                
 135 Id. at 20, 31. 
 136 See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176–78 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
 137 See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 237 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 138 Id. at 236–37. 
 139 Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *21–22 
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016) (quoting Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 
F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
 140 Id. at 28–29 (quoting Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 404 
(E.D.N.Y 2015)). 
 141 Id. at *13–15. 
 142 Id. at *31. 
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the webpage, the court should compare the relative 
conspicuousness of the notice to other elements of the webpage 
and require that the notice be as equally conspicuous as other 
hyperlinks and ads. If the notice would not reasonably disrupt the 
consumer’s attention, the court should find there was no notice.143 
Once notice of the terms is established, courts should require 
companies to provide evidence of clear and parallel wording 
between the written notice and the action taken, which results in 
consumers having notice that their conduct will constitute 
acceptance of those terms.144 For example, in Fteja v. Facebook, 
the court found that the user did have notice that his actions 
constituted assent because the notice of terms mentions “By 
Signing Up”, and the relevant button said “Sign Up.”145 In contrast, 
in Meyer v Kalanick, the found that “the registration screen here 
does not contain parallel wording as between the ‘Register’ button 
and the statement ‘By creating an Uber account, you agree to the 
Terms of Service & Privacy Policy.’” 146  This rule would not 
require the same express assent required by clickwrap, but it 
ensures that the reasonably prudent offeree can quickly and clearly 
understand what actions constitute assent.147 
Additionally, courts should suspiciously view any supposed 
actions manifesting assent that the consumer would have made 
regardless of whether he actually intended to assent. For example, 
a consumer on Amazon.com would click the “Place your order” 
button independent of any intent to consent to the terms.148 When a 
                                                
    143 See id. at *28–29. 
 144 Id. at *30 (citing Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 373–74 
(E.D.N.Y 2015)). 
 145 Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834–35 (S.D.N.Y 2012). 
 146 Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *30 (citing Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 
3d at 373–374). 
 147 See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 236 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing 
Register.com Inc., v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 402–03, 429, n.41 (2d Cir. 
2004)) (“Notably, unlike typical ‘clickwrap’ agreements, clicking ‘Place your 
order’ does not specifically manifest assent to the additional terms, for the 
purchaser is not specifically asked whether she agrees or to say ‘I agree.’”). 
 148 See Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 236–37 (citing Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 835, 840) 
(“Nothing about the ‘Place your order’ button alone suggests that additional 	
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button or action serves the dual purpose of manifesting assent and 
furthering a different objective, there is a greater risk that the 
consumer exclusively intended the non-assenting result.149 Thus, 
courts should presume that the consumer solely intended to 
achieve the other objective unless there is clear notice and parallel 
wording. But, as occurred in Facebook v. Fteja, if the notice is 
relatively conspicuous and clearly indicates that the clicking action 
will constitute assent, then a finding of manifestation of mutual 
assent is warranted.150 
B. Benefits of a Presumption Against Assent 
Adopting a presumption against assent is good for both policy 
and practical reasons. There are two primary doctrinal and policy 
reasons for government enforcement of contracts: protection of 
individual rights and promotion of utilitarian goals.151 Individual 
rights theories promote individual autonomy, self-governance, and 
self-determination through contracting, whereas utilitarian theories 
focus on the social benefits from contracting.152 First, the central 
premise of an individual rights theory is that “contracts should 
promulgate the intent of the parties and ensure the security of 
transactions.” 153  However, without valid consent under the 
individual rights theory, “judicial enforcement of contracts is state 
                                                                                                         
terms apply, and the representation of terms is not directly adjacent to the ‘Place 
your order’ button so as to indicate that a user should construe clicking as 
acceptance.”); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20, 29–30 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (“[C]licking on a . . . button does not communicate assent to 
contractual terms if the offer did not make clear to the consumer that clicking on 
the . . . button would signify assent to those terms.”). 
 149  Meyer, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *32 (quoting Schnabel v. 
Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 127–28 (2d Cir. 2012) (“There is a real risk here 
that Uber’s registration screen ‘made joining [Uber] fast and simple and made it 
appear—falsely—that being a [user] imposed virtually no burdens on the 
consumer besides payment.’”). 
 150 Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 840 (“Fteja was informed of the consequences of 
his assenting click and he was shown, immediately below, where to click to 
understand those consequences.”). 
 151 KIM, supra note 8, at 8–9. 
 152 Id. at 9–10. 
 153 Id. at 212. 
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coercion.”154 Thus, as courts continue to validate wrap contracts 
that stretch the definition of assent, they stretch the legitimacy of 
contract law itself.155 
Second, the idea that contracts serve a utilitarian purpose in a 
market economy is premised on the condition that each party will 
only enter into deals that benefit them and thereby benefit 
society.156 However, if one party is ignorant of the agreement or, 
similarly, if a party has no power to negotiate within a market, then 
there is no structural guarantee that the agreements will, on the 
whole, be net beneficial for society. 157  Widespread use of 
constructive notice means that fewer consumers are genuinely 
participating in the contracting process in a way that yields the 
benefits envisioned by the individual rights and utilitarian 
theories.158 While efficient wrap contracts are necessary in a fast 
moving industrial and information economy,159 if courts allow the 
law to stray too far from its doctrinal underpinnings, then these 
wrap contracts will no longer be beneficial. 160  To protect 
consumer’s individual rights and promote economic flourishing, 
courts must ensure there is true mutual assent by adopting a 
rebuttable presumption against assent in online contracting.  
                                                
 154 Id. at 211. 
 155 Id. at 194. 
 156 Id. at 29 (“Contracts are supposed to be economically efficient because the 
parties are in the best position to assess the value of a particular good or 
service—its ‘value.’ Parties are presumed to have entered into contracts after 
assessing the risks and benefits of a transaction. Their objective is to maximize 
the surplus that the deal can create.”). 
 157 Id. at 30. 
 158 Id. at 174–75. 
 159  Id. at 20–21. (“As mass market sales became possible with 
industrialization, so did mass consumer form contracts . . . . Simplifying the 
contracting process by discouraging or even preventing negotiations shortens the 
time from transaction inception to completion. Given the impracticability of 
negotiating, modifying, or even discussing contractual terms with each of their 
consumers, companies found it much more convenient and efficient to create 
standard terms for standard business transactions.”). 
 160 Id. at 211. 
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A critique is that increasing the notice requirements will not 
make more consumers read terms of use or really understand the 
agreement that they are making.161 However, it does a better job of 
notifying the consumer that they are making an agreement. Over 
time, as courts require more assent, there will be more 
opportunities for consumers and consumer advocates to effect 
change.162 Another potential issue is that requiring more assent 
places a larger burden on businesses and creates more friction in 
commercial transactions.163 However, the policy requirements that 
require clearer manifestations of mutual assent outweigh the 
burdens on business. Browsewrap agreements are inefficient for 
businesses because they run a high risk of being unenforceable.164 
Additionally, the analysis of browsewrap agreements is more 
difficult for courts than the relatively straightforward clickwrap 
analysis. 165  Thus, businesses and courts would benefit from 
increased certainty judicial efficiency.166 By requiring companies to 
                                                
 161 Preston, supra note 58, at 536. 
 162 But see Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? 
Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6, 32-33 
(January 2014) (“[T]he primary cost facing consumers is in reading and 
comprehending contract terms[.]”). 
 163 KIM, supra note 8, at 174–75; Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, The Licensing of 
Intellectual Property: Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the 
Recommendations of the ALI’s “principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 
78 U. CHI. L. REV 165, 167 (2011). 
 164  BREHM, supra note 27, at 4 (citing Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., No. 5:13-
CV-05682-LHK, 2014 WL 2903752, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014) 
(“Generally, courts have declined to enforce browsewrap agreements because 
the fundamental element of assent is lacking.”). 
 165 See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 238 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(“While clickwrap agreements that display terms in a scrollbox and require users 
to click an icon are not necessarily required, they are certainly the easiest 
method of ensuring that terms are agreed to.”). 
 166  Additionally, if companies are required to overcome an initial 
presumption, they will keep better records for evidence. For example, Facebook 
clearly proved that a user had to agree to the terms when creating an account. 
Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834–35 (S.D.N.Y 2012). On the 
contrary, Amazon was unable to prove Nicosia had agreed to clickwrap terms 
when creating his account, which could have resolved the issue much more 
expediently. Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 235, 237–38; see also supra note 106. 
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provide strong evidence of notice, businesses will have increased 
confidence that their agreements will be enforceable, like 
Facebook’s agreement,167 instead of unenforceable, like Uber’s168 
and Amazon’s.169 
As the general public accesses and utilizes new technology, the 
definition of the reasonably prudent offeree must also change to 
reflect new contract formation scenarios. As technological 
developments continue to push consumers further away from 
traditional consent models, establishing the presumption against 
notice becomes even more critical. Consumers will be entering into 
contracts via usage of the Internet of Things170 or by interacting 
with companies in non-traditional contracting settings, such as 
social media.171 Overall, adopting a presumption against assent 
better reflects present reality and better equips courts for future 
changes. 
C. Nicosia v. Amazon.com: Applying the Presumption against 
Assent 
Because the Second Circuit only vacated the motion to dismiss 
and did not decide if there was a manifestation of mutual assent, 
the district court must determine how to evaluate the facts on 
remand.172 The district court should apply the presumption against 
assent, as discussed above, and find that there was no 
manifestation of mutual assent to the Amazon Conditions of Use.173 
The court should focus on the web design and the Nicosia’s actions 
                                                
 167 Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 834–35. 
 168 Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *13–14 
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016). 
 169 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 237. 
 170 See generally Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age of the Internet of 
Things: Article 2 of the UCC and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839 (2016). 
Internet of Things (“IOT”) is a generic phrase describing the growing number of 
internet-connected consumer devices, ranging from smartphones to smart 
thermostats. 
 171 See generally Canis, supra note 57. 
 172 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 237–40. 
 173 As of the writing of this Recent Development, the district court has not yet 
ruled on remanded. 
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to determine (1) if the notice was relatively conspicuous and (2) 
whether Nicosia intended to assent by placing his order. 
First, the district court should evaluate the conspicuousness of 
notice of Conditions relative to the other elements the Amazon 
purchase page to determine if the consumer’s experience would 
have been disrupted. When Nicosia made his purchases in 2013, 
the checkout screen contained a standard blue underlined hyperlink 
to the Conditions of Use and a statement reading, “By placing your 
order, you agree to Amazon.com’s Conditions of Use.”174 The 
hyperlink was located at the very bottom of the page and was set in 
a smaller type then other test on the page.175 As noted by the 
Second Circuit, the Amazon purchase page contained a myriad of 
other colorful, prominent, attention-grabbing advertisements and 
hyperlinks.176 Notably, the “Place your order” button was located in 
an “Order Summary” box, which contained information directly to 
the order being placed.177 However, while the Conditions of Use 
directly relate to the sale, they are not located within this box.178 
Instead, the Conditions of Use were placed as the bottom of the 
page with hyperlinks to Amazon webpages.179 
Based on these facts, the district court should hold that the 
notice of the Conditions of Use was relatively not conspicuous. In 
Meyer v. Kalanick, the court remarked that, based on the design of 
the registration and the relative inconspicuousness of the notice, 
the corporation likely hoped the consumer’s experience would not 
                                                
 174 Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); 
Brief for Appellee at 7, 26, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 
2016); see also supra note 124. 
 175  Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 236–37; Brief for Appellant at 22, Nicosia v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 176 Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 236–37. 
 177 Id. (“The Order Summary box lists the cost of the items to be purchased, 
shipping and handling costs, total price before tax, estimated tax to be collected, 
purchase total, gift card amount, and order total. The words ‘Order total’ appear 
in bold, red font.”). 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
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be “disrupted” by the formal notice.180 Likewise, here, there are 
many other advertisements and programs that Amazon is trying to 
promote to the consumer, as demonstrated by the bold, colorful 
advertisements. This contrasts sharply with the smaller text of the 
notice, which strongly implies a de-emphasizing purpose. 
Furthermore, the Conditions of Use should have been placed 
within the “Order Summary” box with the rest of the relevant order 
information. The proximity and logical topical grouping of order 
related material to the “Place your order” button would have 
placed the reasonably prudent offeree on constructive notice. But, 
by segregating the Conditions of Use from the clearly labeled order 
material, the website design misleads the consumer into 
concluding all of the notices are in that box.181 Had Amazon made 
the text the size of the average text on the page and placed the 
notice within the “Order Summary” box, the notice would be 
relatively conspicuous on the page and would overcome the first 
element of the presumption assent. Since Amazon did not take this 
approach, the district court should find the notice was not 
relatively conspicuous and, thus, there is no manifestation of 
mutual assent. 
Second, if the district court were to find that Nicosia had 
constructive notice of the Conditions of Use, Amazon would need 
to overcome the presumption that Nicosia’s action of placing the 
order did not constitute an intention to manifest assent. Because 
the proposed mechanism for manifesting intent assent is also the 
“Place your order” button, the district court must determine 
whether Nicosia intended both to assent and place his order or just 
simply to place his order. 182  In Specht, the court noted that 
                                                
 180 Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *31 
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016). 
 181 Id. at *32 (quoting Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 127–28 (2d 
Cir. 2012)) (“There is a real risk here that Uber’s registration screen ‘made 
joining [Uber] fast and simple and made it appear—falsely—that being a [user] 
imposed virtually no burdens on the consumer besides payment.’”). 
 182 Indeed, this is exactly what Nicosia argued to the Second Circuit. Reply 
Brief for Appellant at 9, Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 
2016) (“[C]licking ‘Place your order’ accomplishes only what it says. It does not 
provide notice or form a valid agreement to arbitration using clickwrap.”). 
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“clicking on a download button does not communicate assent to 
contractual terms if the offer did not make clear to the consumer 
that clicking on the button would signify assent to those terms.”183 
Here, while clicking “Place your order” is not an inherently 
equivalent manifestation of assent to clicking “I agree,”184 the 
language of the notice closely parallels the language on the button, 
and thus the district court should find the presumption against 
finding an intent to assent is overcome.185 In Facebook v. Fteja, the 
court found the user knew his click would constitute assent due to 
the close proximity and parallel language of the notice and the 
pertinent button.186 Here, because the notice refers to “placing your 
order” and the button is similarly labeled “Place your order,” the 
reasonably prudent offeree would understand that clicking the 
“Place your order” button would constitute assent.187 
Overall, the district court should find that no binding contract 
exists because the reasonably prudent offeree would not have 
constructive notice of the Conditions of Use. Because the 
Conditions of Use are relatively inconspicuous on the page, the 
court cannot assume that the reasonably prudent consumer will be 
aware of them at the time of purchase. Without constructive notice, 
the consumer cannot have the knowledge that placing his order 
constitutes assent. 
                                                
 183 Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 30–31 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 184 Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 236–37 (2d Cir. 2016). 
    185 This is still assuming the court had first found the presumption against 
notice was overcome. See Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 121 (“As a general principle, an 
offeree cannot actually assent to an offer unless the offeree knows of its 
existence.”); see also supra Section III.C (explaining that simultaneously 
evaluating notice and actions manifesting assent constitutes one of the major 
problems with hybridwrap). 
 186 Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835, 840 (S.D.N.Y 2012) 
(finding the intent to assent criteria was satisfied because the notice language 
explicitly stated assent would be manifest “By clicking Sign Up” and the button 
was labeled “Sign Up”). 
 187 Ideally, the notice would state, “by clicking place your order” in order to 
be completely unambiguous. However, the language does not need to be 
verbatim to satisfy the reasonably prudent offeree standard. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
“[T]here is a genuine risk that a fundamental principle of 
contract formation will be left in the dust: the requirement for a 
manifestation of mutual assent . . . . But that would be too cynical 
and hasty a view, and certainly not the law.”188 Because contract 
law is predicated on manifestations of mutual assent, courts must 
endeavor to faithfully protect and apply that doctrine. While it is 
difficult for courts, consumers, and businesses alike to determine 
how we should expect a reasonable consumer to act, the difficulty 
alone is not a reason not to try. Overall, courts have little to gain 
and much to lose from adding hybridwrap as a category of wrap 
contracts. Instead of adopting the ill-advised hybridwrap 
framework, courts should protect individuals from losing important 
rights, especially when those individuals are simply engaging the 
modern information economy. Moving forward, courts need to 
figure out how to return manifestation of mutual assent to central 
prominence in contract formation, and ascertain how it applies in 
the “middle ground” cases. Adopting presumptions that favor 
strong mutual assent requirements will not only protect consumers, 
but also protect contracting in the 21st century. 
                                                
 188 Meyer v. Kalanick, 15 Civ. 9796 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99921, at *34–35 
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016). 
